Realist Theory of Social Science (Theory of Science for the Social Sciences [SIMM23] - Task 5)

Ontological positions such as the positivist, constructivist, the emancipatory standpoint theory and critical realism illustrate the same problem in different ways, and assess and address the problems in different ways. Those who have a standpoint theory, that takes a position on a particular perspective, for example, seem to have a tunnel vision on what they perceive as a problem. It can be roughly explained as they do not discuss whether not a problem is really a problem or not - they know what the problem is (Haraway 1988:578; Hekman 2001:346-347). The positivist vision may also seem to have a very determinations idea of ​​how facts about a problem is collected and determinable by objective measurements. The constructivist way of looking at it is to discuss whether a problem really is a problem, then they mean that the experience of a phenomenon can be subjective - What appears to be a problem in a certain society, may not be so in another. Critical realism seems to be a mixture of these, since it claims that there is both a definite reality that we can relate to, and that the problems we are experiencing is a problem (whether it is subjective or not) (Sayer 2000:19, 22). A problem of social science can be to choose how to attack the problem and gather around one aspect of what is sustainable development. It however seems that many different ontological positions often choose to attack the same, problem but in their own ways.

The different epistemological (the idea of how and what kind of data they can gather) is obviously affected also by one's ontology. In the case of urban crime positivists would try to collect objective facts. They would measure how urban crime looked at one location. Constructivists would instead look at how the site was perceived by those using it and what kind of social conditions that lead to urban crime. Standpoint theorists, on the other hand, here would probably gather data that supported their standpoint. The critical realists would combine the data collection from the various ways that both positivist, constructivists and "standpointers" use.

What also differs between the different ontological conceptions and the methodology used, is the axiological ideals claim that something is good and something else is bad. Research about differences in educational level among various ethnic groups can have different values in different researchers eyes what they constitutes a good education and a poor education. The pure positivists might want to measure knowledge in "objective" terms (one such example is the PISA survey), while the realists and constructivists may have an understanding that different forms of knowledge are rewarded differently in different places, depending on local needs, it's a "situated objective" way of researching (Sayer 2000:32) . The positivist seem to have a clearer and more specific picture of what is right knowledge, while the realists and constructivists view on what is right knowledge is fluid.

References

Haraway, Donna. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege ​of partial perspective. Feminist studies 14 (3), 575-599.

Hekman, Susan. (1997). Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited. Signs 22 (2), ​341-365.

Sayer, Andrew (2000). Realism and social science. London: SAGE

Feminism and science - The feminist standpoint (Theory of Science for the Social Sciences [SIMM23] - Task 4)

”The original formulation of feminist standpoint theory rest on two assumptions: that all knowledge is located and situated, and that on location, that of the standpoint of the women, is privileged because it provides a vantage point that reveals the truth of social reality.” (Hekman 1997:349)

I would say that there is disagreement within the feminist perspective, as to whether feminist theories are part of realism or post-modern constructivism (Hekman 1997:341-342). Based on feminism's own perspective, the feminist standpoint, is the basic assumption that there is the power imbalance, that woman is oppressed by the man, an objective truth, or rather, it requires that it is an objective truth if it is supposed to be worth fighting against patriarchy (Hekman 1997:348) – thus it has an element of realism. One problem with such an approach is that feminism's protagonist, the woman, in contrast to the concept of class, is cross-border, the woman is thus in several groups. It thus becomes difficult to say that all women are alike, because there are so many differences among women (Harding 1983:320-321).

On the other hand it is said that the power imbalance and the different possible positions of power between the sexes is constructed in a social context (Harding 1983:311-313; Hekman 1997:343) – thus it has an element of constructivism . The feminist standpoint, which among other things means that you want to change the social structures, replacing one worldview with another better worldview, is also a constructivist way of thinking.

Thus I would say that there are traits of both realism and post-modern constructivism in the feministic standpoint, and that there is no uniform view of how the feminist perspective should act in their role in the academic world of science .

Just as Harding (1997) argues there is a problem with the feminist standpoint as soon as a group is trying to emphasize that a particular interpretation is correct (Harding 1997:389). The question is which feminist standpoint-phalanx that should set the agenda for a mutual feminist standpoint. Another question is whether this approach is transferable to other cultures.

If you want to get away from social cleavage and subjective social diversity, and claim to possess an objective truth, then there is a risk of becoming an oppressor yourself. Couse even if femninsit knowlegde i ”situated knowledge” (Haraway 1988:581), the question about where this knowledge is situated remains, is this a general situation for all women?

References

Haraway, Donna. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. Feminist studies 14 (3), 575-599.

Harding, Sandra. (1983). Why has the sex/gender system become visible only now? in: Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka (Eds.), Discovering reality: Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science (pp 311-424). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing.

Harding, Sandra. (1997). Comment on Hekman's "Truth and method: Feminist standpoint theory revisited": Whose standpoint needs the regimes of truth and reality? Signs, 22 (2), 382-391.     

Hermeneutiken, kritik och möjligheter (Theory of Science for the Social Sciences [SIMM23] - Task 3)

Hermeneutiken handlar om vetskapen om att vi tolkar alla våra intryck – såväl i vardagen som inom vetenskapen. Den tidig hermeneutik handlade framförallt om hur man tolkade texter,och framförallt utvecklades av den tidiga västerländska hermeneutiken kring Bibeln och huruvida Bibeln skulle tolkas bokstavligt, om denna bokstavliga tolkning var korrekt, och huruvida Bibeln kunde tolkas utifrån olika perspektiv (Gadamer 2006:33-34).

Hermeneutiken hävdar att vår förståelse och vår tolkning av våra upplevelse dels är historiskt bunden då vi har olika historiska förståelseram (Gadamer 2006:33) (bland annat kan ett ords betydelse förändras över tid), dels att vi som individen har olika sätt att tolka våra intryck på (Chalmers 2013:5-6; Schueltz 1953:2-3). Generella koncept som försöker beskriva världen blir ”tomma ord” som på sin höjd beskriver en samling av liknande subjektiva mönster – likt Max Webers koncept ”ideltyp”, något som försöker beskriva verkligheten, men som i sin form mer påminner om ett utopiskt ideal (Gadamer 2006:38). Samtidigt kan man inom både vetenskap och konst se hur tidsandan påverkar vad man väljer att studera/skapa och hur man tolkar resultaten/konsten (Gadamer 2006:41-42).

Kritik mot hermeneutiken är bland annat att den inte har eller tillåter ett kritiskt ändamål (Gadamer 2006:49-50) och svårigheter att avgöra vad som är en korrekt tolkning.

Jag tycker själv att hermeneutiken sätter fingret på problem med vetenskap som försöker hävda att det finns objektiv fakta. Givetvis finns det fakta om är objektiv när man studerar världen. Exempel på sådan objektiv fakta är att människan behöver föda för att överleva, och att det hos idividen i de flesta fall finns en strävan efter att tillgodose dessa behov. Skillnaden ligger dock i hur vi väljer att bemöta dessa utmaningar, hur vi bemöter dem och hur vi rättfärdigar våra val av handlingar. Inom vissa ramar kan alltså mycket kunskap tänkas vara objektiv, men handlingarna kring det objektiva öppnar upp för tolkning. Vi vet att människan måste äta för att överleva, å andra sidan, när vi seren människa äta, vet vi inte om den äter för att den är hungrig (överlevnadsbehov), eller för att den enbart äter för att det är gott (njutning). Ytterligare en svårighet är hur långt man kan dra hermeneutikens ”logik” – om inget någonsin kan innehålla en kärna av sanning eller objektivitet, blir det svårt att korrigera ”problem”, då det som upplevs som problem av en part, kan upplevas som något gott av en annan part. 

Ett annat problem som hermeneutiken stöter på är även idén om att för att förstå något måste du har vissa referensramar/förståelseramar, samtidigt påverkar dessa referensramar vår förståelse (Chalmers 2013; Gadamer 2006:45, 48, 50)

Hermeneutikens ifrågasättande av det objektiva tolkandet ger oss dock möjligheten att, likt retoriken (Gadamer 2006:51), återge kunskap på ett sätt som mottagaren förstår utifrån dennes förståelseramar. Den tillför vetenskapen en förståelse om hur man kan förklara vetenskapen på ett för mottagaren betydelsefullt sätt.

Paul Ricouer

Några huvuddrag i Paul Ricouer hermeneutik är metoden för att hitta ett system förståelse mellan ett fenomen och subjektet (Gadamer 2006:52). Detta innebär att man dels måste förstå målet med en text, men även förstå de symboler som används.

Referenser

Chalmers, Alan F. (2013). What is this thing called science?. 4th ed. Maidenhead: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill Education

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (2006). Classical and philosophical hermeneutics. Theory, culture & society, 23 (1), 29-56.

Gergen, Kenneth J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. American psychologist, 40 (3), 266-275.

Schuetz, Alfred. (1953). Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14, (1), 1-38.

There's no such thing as objective social fact (Theory of Science for the Social Sciences [SIMM23] - Task 2)

A positivist approach provides us with a research method that theoretically allows us to collect objective facts about the world just by observing it (Chalmers 2013:3). The positivist approach also give us hope about possibilities of using this fact to influence the society in a certain direction. For example, by collecting facts about crime, and using this fact to discourage crime. A prerequisite for such a thing to work, however, is that the collected facts is objective and reflects the actual circumstances (Chalmers 2013:3-4), and is valid for the type of crime we studied and designed to reduce. If we study crime in different neighborhoods and see that in neighborhoods, where there is a more widespread collaboration and better connection between the neighbors, have lower crime rates, then we can use this knowledge to try to establish cooperation and enhance the connection between neighbors in areas with higher crime rates, and thus lowering crime rates in the area.

However, this is something that does not always work when the social world does not always respond to actions in the same way everywhere. The positivist approach may thus be a way to begin to understand how reality works, though there are often many more variables to take into consideration. This means that the observed facts can be misleading and incomplete atmight have to be revised (Chalmers 2013:23). And our efforts may fall flat when applied to a different social worlds (in this example, another type of neighborhood) which do not have the same social structures that the previously observed neighborhood (Sayer 2000:15).

A positivist approach can thus serve as a tool to collect social facts, and give us clues about how this social facts can be applied to society. Positivistic facts, however, is not complete, and in order to make use of the collected knowledge, we may have to use other ways to understand the social reality, and understand whether we can make use of our positivist understanding to influence other social units. We might then need to to turn to other approaches than the positivist approach.

References
Chalmers, Alan F. (2013). What is this thing called science?. 4th ed. Maidenhead: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill Education

Sayer, Andrew (2000). Realism and social science. London: SAGE

Theory of Science for the Social Sciences (SIMM23) - Task 1

How would you argue for (or not) that there still are meaningful differences between various social science disciplines?

I really dont know if I want to say that there is a meaningful difference between the various disciplines within the social sciences. I think most disciplines partly overlap each other many times ( they refer to common theorists, and sometimes each others theorists/researchers).

I also believe that many splits between disciplines depends on prestige, pride, prejudice and ignorance. I can even hear lecturers and professors express themselves negatively about other disciplines. This in turn affects students who are not familiar with the other discipline, and therefore can not see through the lecturers and professors prejudice.

Diciplines today

What once is disciplines that parted ways, seems to be increasingly come back together.

This cooperation between disciplines can definitely be just a trend that will persist for decades. But I guess they sooner or later will part again, partly to create a clear understanding of the different social phenomens they are studying, but I also think there are a lot of prestige and interests from their own ranks to position themselves alongside other disciplines .

Today I also seem to see a boom in cross-disciplinary programs at universities in Sweden . However, it is something that I personally am not sure whether it will dilute the public trust of the scientific disciplines and academic education – it gets too theoretical.

To summarize this

I think that:

1) If I'm supposed to see a meaning with the differences between disciplines, it is to create space and opportunities for a discipline to elaborate themselves in their own scientific methods. To evolve without being disturbed by other disciplines.

2 ) While I see a futility in holding on to differences because a lot of scientific knowledge is lost in prestige struggles and mudslinging going on between different disciplines.